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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAYDON ELLIOTT WINGER, 
Plaiuti ff, 
-vs -
lliSURANCECOMPANYOFNORTH 
AMERICA, 
Defendant, Third Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
- VS -
L. A. BOWEN, d/b/a L. A. BOWEN 
INSURANCE, INC., 
Third Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11323 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment snit brought by the 
plaintiff to obtain a judicial declaration that defendant 
Insurance Company of North America furnished prof es-
sional liability insurance to the plaintiff at the time of 
an accident which occurred on or about August 9, 1966, 
at approximately 6 :00 o'clock P.M. Defendant filed a 
third party action against third party defendant Bowen, 
its former agent, seeking a judicial declaration that if 
defendant was liable to plaintiff that third party de-
fendant was liable over to defendant and third party 
plaintiff. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant, declaring that plain-
tiff was insured for professional liability by defendant 
at the time and place of the accident. The court denied 
relief to defendant and third party plaintiff, holding that 
it was not entitled to recover owr against third party 
defendant agent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, third party plaintiff and appellant seeks 
a reversal of that portion of the judgment denying relief 
to it on its third party complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It should be noted at the outset that the record 
consists of one volume of papers and plt>adings filed in 
the action numbered consecutively from 1 to 94; a tran-
se;ript of the proceedings at trial separately numbered 
from 1 to 292; and an envelope of exhibits not numbered 
except by their exhibit number at the trial. References 
to the first volume will be prefaced by the letter "R", 
references to the transcript will be prefaced by "Tr."; 
and references to the exhihits will be prefaced by "Ex." 
and the exhibit number. In this brief we shall refer to 
the plaintiff as he appeared in the court below, to de-
fondant and third party plaintiff Insurance Company of 
North America as INA, and to third party defendant as 
Bowen. 
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Although two full days were taken in presenting evi-
dence, there was very little dispute in the facts. Under 
familiar principles, on this appeal we treat the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing parties, and 
accept the court's findings of fact, except where certain 
findings are inconsistent or where they are unsupported 
by any evidence. We believe that the facts can be most 
easily understood by a chronological presentation: 
Plaintiff entered the practice of his profession of 
dentistry in Utah County in the year 1960. At that time, 
he obtained from the Cordner Agency, predecessor in 
interest of Bowen, a polic~' of professional liability insur-
ance written in IN A, with an inception date of August 9, 
1960, for a term of one year. (Tr. 32; Ex. 1). After the 
initial purchase of insurance, he renewed the policy annu-
ally thereafter through the Cordner Agency until that 
agency was acquired by Bowen in 1962. (Exs. 1-3). The 
practice was, that approximately one month before the 
expiration of the policy term, the agency would send 
plaintiff a renewal request form, which he would sign 
and return, and a renewal policy would thereafter be 
issued. After Bowen acquired the Cordner Agency in 
1962, he became licensed as an agent for INA, and he 
continued to serve plaintiff for purposes of professional 
liability insurance and continued to renew the policies 
in the same fashion. (Exs. 4-7; Tr. 35, 52-53, 56, 119, 139). 
The last policy was dated August 9, 1965, with an expira-
tion date of 12 :01 A.M. August 9, 1966. (Ex. 7). 
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During the last policy year, Bowen's agency agree-
ment with INA was cancelled. Bowen at first testified ! 
that the termination occurred in Jnly of 1966. (Tr. 115). 
However, after being confronted with Ex. ~4, a letter 
written to him by the manager of IN A's Salt Lake Service 
Office, dated December 16, l 965, he concluded that he 
was in error and that the agency termination occurred 
on or about December 16, 1965. (Tr. 140, 145, 166, 167-168, 
1G9). The records of IN A established December 16, 1965, 
as the closing date of the agency (Ex. 25) and this was 
also the testimony of Merlin Perkins, who at the time 
of the incident here involved was a field representative 
of INA in its Salt Lake Office. (Tr. 223, 224, 228). The 
evidence is without dispute that the termination of the 
agency occurred before the time Bowen attempted to 
renew the Winger policy. (Tr. 162). 
Under the agreement for termination of the agency, 
Bowen was permitted to continue to service INA policies 
still in force up to the time of their respective expiration 
dates. In this connection, he was permitted to counter-
sign endorsements to the policies, etc. (Tr. 147, 224). 
However, he had no authority to bind the company for 
any additional, new or renewal liability. He was also 
required to surrender his agency contract, policy forms, 
and other company supplies, and he did so. (Tr. 144, 
145, 229-230). The exact terms of the termination agree-
ment as set forth in Ex. 2-1 are as follows: 
"In accordance with the provisions of the Ag-
ency Agreement between your agency and the 
Insurance Company of North America, we wish to 
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advise that we are termiuating your appointment 
effective December lG, 19G5. You are however 
granted by this letter, limited authority to per-
form snch acts as may be necessarv for the con-
venience of all parties intt•rested in. the continued 
administration of outstanding policies issued dur-
ing the representation of your agency. Your 
acceptance and retention of agency license for this 
Company is considered as acceptance of the lim-
ited authority granted by this letter. 
"Snbject to acceptance by the Company, you 
are authorized to issne and conntersign endorse-
ments to outstanding policies originally issued as 
above. Any additional premiums involved will be 
paid to the Company. 
"This limited aitthority does not include the 
binding of the Company for any additional, new 
or renewal liability. Snch authority may be termi-
nated by either party on written notice to the 
other and shall automatically terminate if the li-
cense is not maintained, or upon expiration of the 
last remaining policy now upon the books." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
'l'hat Bowen understood that he had no right to bind 
coverage in INA and conld not renew INA policies is 
abundantly clear from his own testimony as follows: 
"Q. But you did not have the right to make re-
newals 1 
A. No. 
Q. And yon understood that? 
A. I knew I could not order a renewal from IN A. 
Q. You knew you could not bind coverage of IN A, 
didn't you~ 
A. Yes." (Tr. 147, Lines 17-25). 
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Neither INA nor Bowen gave any notice to the plain. , 
tiff of the termination of Bowen's agency. (Tr. 48, 55, 
119, 238, 290). On or about July 7, 1966, in accordance 
with the previous practice, but without any authority 
whatsoever, Bowen sent to the plaintiff a renewal request 
form for the renewal of the expiring professional liability 
policy. (Ex. 14, Tr. 38-39, 118). The request did not 
specifically indicate that the renewal policy would be 
placed in INA but did show INA as the carrier on the 
expiring policy and referred to it by policy number. 
(Ex. 14). Bowen was at this time a licensed agent of 
several other companies, including U.S.F.&G. Company, 
in which he had binding authority. (Tr. 138, 163). 
rrhe plaintiff took no immediate action with respect 
to the renewal request and approximately a week before 
the expiration date, another copy of the renewal request 
was sent to plaintiff. (Tr. 40, 127). According to the 
testimony of the plaintiff and his wife, the original re-
newal request was signed by plaintiff and mailed back 
to Bmven with a check covering the amount of the prem-
ium on the afternoon of August 8, 1966. (Tr. 41, 76). 
Although there was evidence casting doubt upon the mail-
ing date, the court believed the testimony of plaintiff and 
his wife, and found that the renewal request was mailed 
on August 8, 1966, before the expiration of the last pol-
icy. (R. 63). The check was deposited by Bowen to his 
account and subsequently used to purchase a professional 
liability policy for plaintiff in U.S.F. & G. Company. 
(Tr. 69). 
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On the afternoon of August 9, 1966, at about 6 :00 
o'clock PM., and about eighteen hours after the last policy 
had expired, plaintiff had an accident in treating a child 
patient, whereby a dental instrument penetrated her eye, 
causing her.injury. (Tr. 43, R. 70). HO"wever, no notice 
thereof was given to Bowen or to INA until several days 
thereafter. (Tr. 66, 84-, 156, 157, 237, 245). 
Bowen testified that he received the renewal request 
and check on August 10, 1966, (Tr. 125, 151) and the 
court so found. ( R. 69-70). On the same date, he sub-
mitted a memorandum to Rulon 1\Ieyers, a licensed agent 
of INA, with whom he had no personal acquaintanc<>, 
(Tr. 191-192) requesting him to renew the expired policy. 
(Tr. 152, Ex. 26). He knew that he had no authority 
to renew the coverage, and for that reason sought to 
broker it through a licensed agent of INA. (Tr. 119, 153). 
He also knew that Meyers was under no obligation to 
renew the policy if he did not wish to do so. (Tr. 154). 
Although Meyers could have bound coverage in INA 
for plaintiff, he did not do so. Instead, when Meyers 
n~ceived Bo,vt;n's request for renewal, he wrote a memo-
randum to Merlin Perkins at INA's Salt Lake Service 
Office requesting a renewal. (Tr. 231, Ex. 39). The 
memorandum was dated August 12, 1966, and bears IN A's 
"received stamp" showing receipt on August 15, 1966. 
( 'l1r. 232, Ex. 39). Perkins testified that he called Meyers 
on the same date and advised him that INA would be 
1m\\rilling to renew the business unless it received the 
supporting business of the plaintiff. (Tr. 236-237). 
MPyPrs asked Pt>rkins to confirm this in writing, and 
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Perkins endorsed the information on the same memoran-
dum and returned it to Meyers on the same day. (Tr. 
236, 237; Ex. 39). Meyers then endorsed onto the memo-
randum a note to his secretary to call and advise that 
he could not place the insurance. (Tr. 278, Ex. 39). 
Meyers did not have personal knowledge as to whether 
his secretary actually made the call. (Tr. 279). Up to 
this time, Perkins had no knowledge whatsoever of am 
potential claim and there is no evidence that any officer, 
agent, or employee of INA had any knowledge that plain-
tiff had had an accident or would be presenting a claim. 
(Tr. 236, 237). 
Some days after the accident, Mrs. Winger called 
Bowen's office and first sought to obtain a copy of plain-
tiff's policy. (Tr. 83-84). At a later time, she advised 
Bowen that her husband had had an accident. (Tr. 84-85, 
156). Bowen told her that her husband should make a 
written report of the accident and deliver it to him. (Tr. 
85, 157). According to the testimony of Mrs. Winger, 
her husband prepared a written report that night and 
she delivered it to Bowen's office the next day. (Tr. 85). 
Bowen testified that on the same day that he received 
the statement, he transmitted it to Kenneth Ross, cus-
tomer service representative of INA at its Salt Lake 
office. (Tr. 157; Exs. 20, 27). The letter of transmittal 
hears the date of August 20 and INA's "received stamp" 
of August 22. The statement of plaintiff also bears 
INA's "received stamp" of Augnst 22. (Exs. 20, 27). The 
receipt of this letter from Bowen was IN A's first knowl-
edge of any claim of loss. (Tr. 245, Ex. 27). 
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Mr. Ros::; commenced an investigation of the accident 
the following day, August 23, by interviewing Dr. Winger 
and obtaining a signed statement from him (Tr. 46); 
calling at Bowen's office to obtain necessary policy infor-
mation (Tr. 248); and then interviewing the father of 
the injured child. (Tr. 256). The next morning when 
Ross returned to his Salt Lake office and checked the 
policy information against a specimen form of the policy, 
he discovered that the accident had occurred after the 
expiration date of the policy. (Tr. 249, 257). He promptly 
notified Bowen of this fact, and a few days later (August 
27 to August 30), Ross and Bowen met with the Wingers, 
and Ross advised them that the policy had expired and 
that INA had declined to renew it for underwriting 
reasons, and therefore there was no coverage. (Tr. 47-48, 
GS, 135, 158, 159, 249, 250-251). 
Shortly thereafter, this action was cormnenced on 
behalf of plaintiff for a declaratory judgment to the effect 
that INA covered the accident in question and was obli-
gated to defend any suit cormnenced against plaintiff 
by the injured patient. (R. 3-5). INA impleaded Bowen 
as a third party defendant, contending that if INA had 
any liability to the plaintiff, it was only as a result of 
the unauthorized acts of Bowen in attempting to bind or 
renew coverage in INA after his agency agreement had 
been terminated. (R. 10-13). 
The trial judge concluded that since no notice had 
eyer been given to the plaintiff of the termination of 
Howpn's agency, that Bowen had apparent or ostensible 
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authority to renew policies in INA, and that since the 
\Vingers had mailed the renewal request before the ex-
piration date of the expiring poliry, that coverage was 
renewed. ( R. 53, 62, 64, 69). The court also found, con-
trary to all of the evidence, that so far as plaintiff's appli-
cation for renewal ·was concerned, that Bowen was an 
agent for INA and, likewise without any evidence what-
soever, concluded that INA had ratified the acts of 
Bowen. (R. 71, 72). The evidence was undisputed that 1 
Bowen's agency agreement had been terminated many 
months before the transaction here involved, as herein-
abo\-e fully demonstrated. In fact, Bowen's counsel so 
admitted in his opening statement. ('l'r. 16). As soon 
as INA received a request for renewal of the Winger 
policy, it was promptly rejected, although IN A then had 
no knowledge of a possible claim. As soon as INA dis-
covered that the accident occurred after the expiration 
time of its prior policy, it promptly advised plaintiff that 
there was no coverage. There was no evidence whatso-
ever of any ratification. 
INA filed seasonable objections to the court's find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, motion to a11wnd 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and motion for 
new trial (R. 77-80), all of which were overruled and 
denied (R. 85-86), and this appeal followed. (R. 87). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT AND 
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A GA I N ST DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY 
PLAINTIFF, AND AS A MATTER OF LAW DE-
FENDANT AND THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF INA IS 
E N T IT LE D TO JUDGMENT AGAINST THIRD 
PARTY DEFENDANT BOWEN IF PLAINTIFF IS 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER AGAINST INA. 
The general rule with regard to the liability of an 
insurance agent to his principal company is set forth in 
4-4 C.J.S. 834, Insurance, Section 159: 
"An insurance agent is liable in damages for 
any loss sustained by the company arising from 
the agent's breach of duty ... Thus, if the agent 
issnes a policy in violation of his instructions, he 
will be liable to the company for the amount of 
loss which it has been compelled to pay on such 
policy, together with expenses incurred in con-
nection therewith, ... " (Emphasis ours.) 
'l'o the same effect is 29 Am.Jur. 557-8, Insurance, Section 
159: 
"In so far as the insurance company is con-
cerned, an insurance agent must act in good faith, 
confine his acts within the scope of his actual 
authority, obey his principal's instructions, and 
use due care and reasonable diligence in the trans-
action of the business entrusted to him. The agent 
is, as a general rule, liable to the company for 
the losses resulting proximately from a failure in 
or departure from such duties. Although an in-
surance agent may within his apparent or ostensi-
ble authority bind the company to risks which his 
instructions forbid him to assume, he is liable to 
the company if he issues a policy in violation of 
his instructions and thereby subjects the company 
to a liability which it has forbidden him to assume 
for it. In such case, the agent is liable to the 
company for the amount of insurance paid and 
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expenses incurred by the c01npan)' on account of a 
loss undtir the policy, and he cannot ddcat a re. 
covery by showing that the company might have 
escaped liability on the policy b)· litigation, at 
least if it appears that the company paid the lo" 
in good faith to avoid it, and would have been 
taking chances of incurring further liability by 
resorting to it." (l~mphasis ours.) 
See also Coitch on Insurance 2d, Section 26:350: 
"If an agent for an insurance company re-
ceives clear and explicit instructions from his prin-
cipal with respect to mattPrs delegatPd to him, 
he must exercise good faith and reasonable dili-
gence in the execution of such orders, under pen-
alty of liability to his employer for any loss result-
ing from a departure from, or failure to so carry 
out, such instructions. Converi'wly, the agent has 
no right to weigh the wisdom or expediency of the 
instructions ginn him and to disobey them bc'-
causc he does not deem them proper. 
"As illustrations of thesP principles, the agent 
of an insurer is liable to it for loss occasioned the 
insitrer becaiise the agent has issued a policy con-
trary to instrnctions, insured a prohibited risk, 
issued a policy in excess of a spticified maximum, 
or failed to cancel a policy." (Emphasis ours.) 
Our research has failed to discover a single case like 
the case at bar, wherein an agent whose writing authority 
has been cancelled has att0mpted to renew an expiring· 
policy in the same company. HmvPver, if a dnly licensed 
agent is liable to his compan.Y for violation of instructions 
for failure to cancPl a policy, or to reduce the amount 
of coverage, or for writing a prohibited risk, it would 
St·em a fortiori that he must b(' liahl<> to the company if 
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he causes it to incur a liability by acting wholly beyond 
the scope of his actual authority. The reasoning of the 
courts in the following cases is persuasive: 
Manufactitrers Casualty Insu.rance Co. v. Martin 
Lebreton Insurance Agency, 242 F.2d 951: 
"The law is well settled: that an agent owes 
to his principal the obligation of high fidelity; that 
he may not proceed without, or beyond his author-
ity, particu.larly were he has been forbidden to 
act; and that, if so proceeding, his actions cause 
loss to the. principal, the agent is fully account-
able to the principal therefor. (Emphasis ours.) 
"Under the undisputed facts . . . and the 
settled law applicable thereto, unless and until the 
principal, with full knowledge of all the applicable 
facts, waived the breach of his instructions and 
adopted the agent's act, in writing the bond, as 
its own the agent became and remained liable to 
the principal for the damages resulting from its 
assuming to act to the disadvantage of its prin-
cipal without authority .... 
* * * 
"The case was not tried and determined on 
its facts. Instead, it was determined as a matter 
of law and without a trial on the incorrect assump-
tion that, notwithstanding the agent's admitted 
and grievous breach of its duty, it could escape 
the loss and throw it on its principal upon the 
mere claim that the principal did not immediately 
repu.diate the bond. [Sic] The law is not so writ-
ten." 
American Fire and Marini? Insitrance Company vs. 
81?ymo1tr, (La. App.), 144 So. 775: 
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In this case, defendant agent wrote two pol-
1c1es in direct violation of written instructions 
from the home office of the plaintiff company, and 
·was held liable to the plaintiff for the losses sus-
tained. The court said: 
"Nowhere in their brief do counsel for the 
appellant discuss the question of the liability of 
an insurance agent for the loss incurred b;; an 
insurance company through the unanthorized issu-
ance of a policy by the agent. We presume that 
liability is conceded in such a case. Counsel for 
plaintiff discusses this question in a most illumi-
nating manner in their brief, but since the point 
appears to be conceded, and, since the question of 
the liability of an agent for unauthorized issuance 
is so elemental, we refrain from any discussion or 
further reference to that feature of the case.'' 
U. S. Casitalty Cmnpany vs. Hiers, 233 S.C. 333, 10-:1 
SE2d 561: 
"It is well settled by general rule that failure 
of an agent of an insurer to comply with the 
instructions of the latter, whereby loss to it re-
sults, is liable over to the insurer." 
To the same effect, see Phoenix Insurance Company vs. 
Sccgers, 192 Ala. 103, 68 So. 902; Queen City Fire Ins1tr-
a11cc Company vs. First National Bank of Hannaford, 
18 N.D. 603, 120 N.W. 505; Franklin Fire Insurance Com-
pany vs. Bradford, 201 Pa. 32, 50 A. 286; Insurance Com-
pany of North Amcrica vs. Baer, (Kan.), 147 P. 840; 
National Union Fire Insitrancc Company of Pittslnirg vs. 
Dickinson, ("Wash.), 159 P. 125. 
One aspect of this general rule is wc~ll illustrated in 
the annotation of 106 ALR at 1379, Liauility of Insurance 
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Agent to Insnrer Because of Failure to Ca11cel or Reduce 
Risk. The rule is there stated as follows: 
"If an insurance company ... directs its agent 
to cancel or reduce [the risk], it is his dutv to do 
so with reasonable promptness, and if h~ negli-
gently or wilfully fails to carry out peremptory 
instructions to cancel or reduce he is liable to the 
insurer for the amount which it is required to pay 
in settlement of the loss." 
The most similar Utah case which our research has 
discovered is Phoenix Insurance Compm1y vs. Heath, 
(Utah), 61 P.2d 308. This court there said: 
"It is undoubtedly the law that, where an 
insurance company under the terms of the policy 
of insurance is entitled to cancel the policy or 
reduce its amount, it may direct its agent to cancel 
or reduce and it is the duty of such agent forth-
with to do so, and, if he negligently delays in 
obeying his instructions and loss occurs thereby, 
he is liable to the insurer for the amount it is 
required to pay in settlement of the loss. * * * 
"Defendants do not question the rule of law 
above stated, but attempt to relieve themselves 
from liability for the delay by saying they had a 
right to ask the company for a reconsideration 
of its demand and that the letter of the 16th from 
the company to the agents in reply to the agents' 
letter of November 13th is a recognition of the 
right to ask for a reconsideration and is a waiver 
of the delay up to that time and that they had a 
reasonable time, that is, three to five days, in 
which to comply with the request for reduction 
after the receipt of the second letter. The loss 
having already occurred before receipt of the 
16 
letter, the question of reasonable time is imma. 
terial and that they are not liable for the delay. 
"It may be conceded that def Pndants had a 
right to ask for reconsidt>ration of the peremptory 
order to reduce the amount of insurance, but, 1 
where such request is made under the circmn-
stances as sho-..vn by this record, the question still 
remains whether the delay thereby occasioned \YR> 
at the risk of the agents or at the risk of the 
principal. * * * 
"It would seem to follow from the plaintiff', 
instructions to its agents and the law as announced 
in the cases referred to that defendants were under 
the duty to promptly reduce the amount of the 
policy according to the positive directions of their 
principal and that the delay in so doing was at 
their own risk." 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant INA's liability to plaintiff arises solrly 
out of the unauthorized and wrongful acts of third party 
defendant Bowen in holding himself out as a licensed 
agent of INA, authorized to renew policies of insurance 
in that company. Since defendant has incurred liability 
to the plaintiff by reason of such wrongful acts, defend-
ant INA is entitled to judgment over against third party 
defendant whose wrongful and unlawful conduct created 
the liability. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1205 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, ·utah 
